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Abstract
It will ultimately be necessary for the European Union (“EU”) to stop simultaneously handling
economic issues by the Community method and foreign policy measures by an undemocratic
intergovernmental method. When the time comes for a single method to be chosen, it is important
for the long-term stability of the Union and for the small Member States, that the Commission
and the Community method in operation be suitable. Unfortunately, the result of the proposed
Constitution devalues it.
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CONVENTION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
TREATY FOR EUROPE
John Temple Lang*
"For most important things, success actually requires avoiding many
separate causes of failure."1
"The object of our inquiry is, Is the power necessary, and is it
guarded ?,,2
"The failure of British politicians is their inability to recognise that
the nightmare Germany's leaders wish to avoid is the 19th century
balance-of-power politics that British deem normal."3
"A long time, and much prudence, will be necessary to reproduce a
spirit of union and reverence for government."4
SUMMARY
The Convention has reached a consensus on a number of
principles for the new Constitutional Treaty for Europe. Never-
theless, the next InterGovernmental Conference ("IGC") will be
faced with important and controversial issues concerning the
size of the Commission. The proposal to reduce the number of
voting Commissions to fifteen would mean that at any one time,
two-fifths or more of the Member States would have no nominee
acting as a full voting Member of the Commission, thus prevent-
ing those Member States from having full confidence in the
Commission. This would devalue the "Community method,"
which depends on a fully representative and independent Com-
mission consisting of nominees of all Member States. This is par-
ticularly important because the scope of majority voting and co-
decision with Parliament has already been widened, and is likely
* Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Brussels; Professor, Trinity College, Dublin;
Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Oxford. I am grateful to Eamonn Gallagher for many
valuable comments on this Article. This Article is based on the text of the Draft Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe.
1. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL 157 (1997)
2. John Marshall, Address at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, at http://www.
constitution.org/rc/ratva-08.htm (June 10, 1788).
3. Germany's Europe, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at 25.
4. DAVID RAMSAY, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (1807) (writing at the time of
George Washington's inauguration).
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to be widened further. The Commission's role as a mediator
with the exclusive right to propose economic measures is essen-
tial to make majority voting acceptable.
Due to the Common Foreign and Security Policy's ("CFSP")
intergovernmental status, the issues of a Council President and a
Foreign Minister also concern variations on inter-governmental-
ism. The clauses on CFSP are open to two major criticisms.
First, they largely exclude the Commission - its only power is to
veto proposals made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As a
result, there are no "checks and balances." Second, there is no
democratic control of CFSP. The Minister merely "consults" the
Parliament which is not responsible to CFSP. This is not the
Community method.
It will ultimately be necessary for the European Union
("EU") to stop simultaneously handling economic issues by the
Community method and foreign policy measures by an undemo-
cratic intergovernmental method. When the time comes for a
single method to be chosen, it is important for the long-term
stability of the Union and for the small Member States, that the
Commission and the Community method in operation be suita-
ble. Unfortunately, the result of the proposed Constitution de-
values it.
INTRODUCTION
Everyone understands the principle of separation of legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial powers, in a unitary State, and the
broad distinction between central and regional powers in a fed-
eration is also well-known.
What is now called the "Community method" in European
cooperation is less well understood. The Commission was in-
vented for a purpose, but many people do not know what it is. It
is somewhat complex, and it comes from mediation theory
rather than political science, but it is clear. An independent and
representative mediator institution makes balanced proposals
which are designed to reconcile the interests of all the Member
States. The mediator body decides nothing in relation to new
policies - they are decided by the Council and Parliament. The
mediator's role is to make majority voting acceptable to a minor-
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ity which may be outvoted.5 This, the original basic conception
of the Commission, requires it to propose new policies in the
interests of the whole EU, safeguarding minority interests as
much as possible. Because it does not itself adopt or approve
5. The reasons for inventing the Commission, and the way it works in practice, are
explained more fully in JOHN TEMPLE LANG & EAMONN GALLAGHER, THE ROLE OF THE
COMMISSION AND QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING (Institute of European Affairs, Occasional
Paper No. 7 1995) [hereinafter ROLE OF THE COMMISSION]; John Temple Lang &
Eamonn Gallagher, What Sort of European Commission Does the European Union Need?, 1
EUROPARATrSLIG TIDSRUFT 81 (2002); John Temple Lang, How Much do the Smaller Mem-
ber States Need the European Commission?, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 315 (2002); John
Temple Lang, Institutional Changes in the European Union to Prepare for Enlargement: Which
Role for the Commission? 2000-2 ERA-FORUM 2, 2-9 (2000); John Temple Lang, Community
Constitutional Law, in CONSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 124, 217 (Brigid
Laffan ed., 1996) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION-BUILDING]. Comments on some aspects of
the Convention can be found in John Temple Lang, The Commission: The Key to the
Constitutional Treaty for Europe, 26 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1598 (2003). See also Francois
Lamoureux, La Constitution "PMtndope" une Refondation Pour en Finir Avec les Repldtrages,
REVUE DU DROIT DE L'UNION EUROP9ENNE, Jan. 2003, at 13 (discussing the Draft Consti-
tution which was used by the Convention as the basis of much of its drafting and cor-
rectly describing the "Community method" but omitting any reference to the sole right
of initiative in describing the role of the Commission). See also Mattera, Les Zones
D 'ombre du Projet de Constitution Dans I 'Architecture Institutionnelle de l'Union est la Composi-
tion de la Commission, REVUE DU DROIT DE L'UNION EUROPIENNE, Jan. 2003, at 5-12 (as-
sessing the Convention's proposals on the Commission as a "solution fdcheuse pour
grands et petits").
The Convention's principal Article on the Commission (Article 1-25(1)) specifi-
cally excludes it from the Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP"):
The European Commission shall promote the general European interest and
take appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the
Constitution, and steps taken by the Institutions under the Constitution. It
shall oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of
Justice. It shall execute the budget and manage programmes. It shall exercise
coordinating, executive and management functions, as laid down in the Con-
stitution. With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and
other cases provided for in the Constitution, it shall ensure the Union's exter-
nal representation. It shall initiate the Union's annual and multiannual pro-
gramming with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements.
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art. 1-25(1), O.J. C
169/1, at 13 (2003) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty]. Article 1-25(2) reads:
"Except where the Constitution provides otherwise, Union legislative acts can be
adopted only on the basis of a Commission proposal. Other acts are adopted on the
basis of a Commission proposal where the Constitution so provides." Id. art. 1-25(2), at
13.
Several draft treaties had been prepared before the Convention finished sitting.
For the text of a treaty which the U.K Government would have preferred, see Alan
Dashwood et al., Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union and Related Documents,
28 EUR. L. REv. 3 (2003). For the U.K. Government's view after the Convention, see
THE BRITISH APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN UNION INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE
2003 (White Paper, Sept. 2003).
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new policies, its composition need not be in proportion to the
population of the EU. It is a think-tank, not a representative
body. The Community method is based on a Commission
equally independent of all the Member States and on which
each State has a nominee at all times. Clearly, the Community
method is more beneficial for small Member States, which need
institutional safeguards, than intergovernmentalism without in-
stitutional safeguards, or the confused provisions of the Treaty of
Nice. The Commission is the only safeguard for minority inter-
ests in all cases in which majority voting is allowed.
The intergovernmental method is also clear. In principle,
all States have to agree, but small States can be bought off or put
under pressure. No third approach to international cooperation
has been suggested. The Community method and intergovern-
mentalism are mutually incompatible and while they cannot be
mixed, they can be used in different spheres if a satisfactory fron-
tier can be drawn between them.
The intergovernmental method comes in several versions.
If unanimity is required, even a small State has a veto, but it may
not be wise to exercise it often. Another version does not re-
quire unanimity, and a dissenting State is not bound by the deci-
sion of the majority, but may be inconvenienced by its conse-
quences. The least attractive version of the intergovernmental
approach is majority decisions not based on proposals made by
an independent representative mediator institution.
A less clear version of intergovernmentalism can arise indi-
rectly. It arises in each of the new offices or institutions which
have been suggested by Member States in the Convention. Two
new offices, the "President of the Council" and the "Foreign
Minister" would, in practice, act on the instructions of a majority
of the governments in the Council, without the safeguard that
would come from directives proposed by the Commission as an
impartial mediator. Each of these proposals would bypass the
Commission and the Community method, and they are presum-
ably designed to do so. If the Community method is not used,
decisions will be taken by some kind of majority, probably in
practice by the delegates of the six large Member States (seven,
when Turkey joins).
Supporters of the intergovernmental approach even go so
far as to suggest that the Commission should be responsible to
547
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the Council as well as the European Parliament, although the
independence of the Commission is now guaranteed precisely by
the fact that it is appointed by the Council and removable only
by the Parliament. It is no coincidence that these three new sug-
gestions have all been made by large Member States.
It is now necessary to look at the result of the Convention as
objectively as possible, not comparing it with the previous Trea-
ties (in some respects it is clearly an improvement), or with some
of the undesirable suggestions made during the Convention, or
with the unsatisfactory Treaty of Nice, but on its merits, concen-
trating on the most important issues. The undoubted fact that
the Convention proposal is better than the Treaty of Nice should
not conceal its disadvantages or cause it to be accepted uncriti-
cally. The question is not whether a more satisfactory treaty
could have been obtained at this time, but whether it is a satisfac-
tory treaty in the long term. To assess it objectively, it must be
viewed as a kind of constitution, not merely as a treaty.
I. THE CONVENTION'S ACHIEVEMENTS
The Convention has not agreed on a complete new treaty.
The intention is that a small number of important issues will be
decided by an InterGovernmental Conference. At or before that
conference, alliances and agreements can be made between the
large Member States, and pressure can, if necessary, be put on
the smaller ones. The new treaty will not now be signed anyway
until after the accession of the new Member States in May 2004.
In order to put the remaining issues facing the IGC in con-
text, it is necessary to outline the issues on which the Convention
has substantially agreed.
In French legal theory, a distinction is made between a
"framework treaty" [traitg-cadre] and a "treaty law" [traitg loi]
which sets out substantive rights and duties. This paper is con-
cerned with the parts of the new treaty which concern the future
institutions, not with the objectives and policies of the Union.
The institutional provisions are likely in the long term to be
more important than the proposed policy clauses, but in any
case, in the next year or so they will be more controversial and
more widely discussed.
The disadvantages of intergovernmentalism do not affect
the majority of the Convention's achievements. The Convention
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has substantially agreed on a series of important points to be
included in the proposed new Constitutional Treaty. The most
important points are:6
1. The Treaty will say that powers in certain areas and for
certain purposes are attributed to the EU, subject to the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National
parliaments will be able to intervene politically if they be-
lieve that a proposal is contrary to the subsidiarity princi-
ple, and if it is adopted it can be challenged in the Court
of Justice. The principle that Member States must coop-
erate in good faith to pursue the EU objectives, which is
already in the existing Treaties, will be confirmed and ex-
tended.7
2. The EU will be one legal entity, under a single, relatively
simple, new Constitutional Treaty, which will replace the
existing Treaties.
3. The new Treaty will include the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and a legal basis for future accession to the Euro-
pean Convention on Fundamental Rights.
4. The new treaty will contain various constitution-style pro-
visions on exclusive and concurrent powers, and on cate-
gories of EU measures.
5. There will be power to adopt other measures not ex-
pressly foreseen but which may be considered necessary
in the future, if the Council is unanimous and the Euro-
pean Parliament agrees. This, now referred to as "flexi-
bility," and now in Article 17 of the Draft Treaty, already
exists in Article 308 of the EC Treaty.
8
6. See MICHAEL DOUGAN, THE FEDERAL TRUST FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, THE
CONVENTION'S DRAF-r CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY: A 'TIDYING-UP EXERCISE' THAT NEEDS
SOME TIDYING UP OF ITS OWN (2003); see also PAUL CRAIG, THE FEDERAL TRUST FOR EDU-
CATION AND RESEARCH, WHAT CONSTITUTION DOES EUROPE NEED? THE HOUSE THAT GIS-
CARD BUILT: CONSTITUTIONAL ROOMS WITH A VIEW (2003).
7. For a discussion on Articles 5 and 10, see FtDERATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE
DROIT EUROP9EN, General Report: The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts
and the Community Institutions under Article 10 EC Treaty, in 1 XIX FIDE CONGRESS 373-
426 (2000) [hereinafter XIX FIDE CONGRESS]; 4 XIX FIDE CONGRESS 65-72;John Tem-
ple Lang, The Duties of Cooperation on National Authorities and Courts Under Article 10 EC:
Two More Reflections, 26 EUR. L. REv. 84, 84-93 (2001).
8. See Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
art. 308, O.J. C 325/33, at 153 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, at 140 (ex Article 235) [hereinafter
Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating changes made Iy Treaty of Nice amending the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and
certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice]
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6. There will be important provisions on economic coopera-
tion.
7. It is accepted that the scope of qualified majority voting
will be extended, replacing unanimity in some important
areas, yet to be agreed. All measures which can be sub-
ject to majority voting in the Council will need the con-
sent of the Parliament in the co-decision procedure - an
important pro-democracy step.
8. It is suggested, but not agreed, that a qualified majority
will be a simple majority of States, having, e.g., sixty per-
cent of the population of the EU - a simple and intelli-
gible rule, but one which gives much greater weight to,
e.g., Germany (population 80 million) than to Spain
(population 40 million) and the smaller Member States,
than is given under the Nice Treaty voting formula.
9. There will be provisions on developing a common for-
eign and security policy.
9
10. Future Treaty changes will be subject to co-decision by
the Parliament.
11. The Euro currency zone will be given constitutional sta-
tus.
Although the present three "Pillars" will be formally abol-
ished, foreign policy and most justice measures will not be
adopted with the safeguards provided by the Community
method. It will therefore be important to see how far measures
not subject to the Community method will continue to be, as
they are at present, subject to unanimity.
II. THE MAIN ISSUES FOR THE IGC CONFERENCE
The principal issues that the IGC - in which the new Mem-
ber States will take part - needs to resolve are:
1. The number of Commissioners, and their appointment
and removal from office;
(amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
9. See generally SIMON DUKE, EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE
CONVENTION, THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS: EFFECTS AND IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR THE EU AND ITS INTERNATIONAL ROLE (Working Paper No. 2003/W/2,
2003).
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2. The election and powers of the President of the Commis-
sion;
3. The proposal for a long-term President of the Council;
4. The proposal for an EU "Foreign Minister";
5. The areas to be made subject to qualified majority voting
and co-decision, instead of unanimity, as at present;
6. The weighting of votes in the Council and the "double ma-
jority" (a majority of Member States, and a majority of the
population of the EU).
The last two issues are not discussed in this paper.'0
A. The Size of the Commission
There are now essentially two views regarding the size of the
Commission:
1. The Commission should be composed of one nominee
from each Member State, irrespective of the number of
Member States. This is essential for the Commission's pol-
icy-proposing tasks, and for its law-enforcing role, for the
foreseeable future. It is essential that all Member States
have full confidence in the Commission at all times.1 The
10. See RICHARD BALDWIN & MIKA WIDGREN, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES,
DECISION-MAKING AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY: WILL THE IGC DISCARD GISCARD?
(2003). Baldwin and Widgren discuss the importance of the Commission's role in set-
ting the agenda (but not for CFSP), and argue that the Commission's power is indi-
rectly increased under the Constitutional Treaty because the double majority rule for
voting makes it easier for the Council to adopt measures than under the Nice Treaty
formula. Baldwin and Widgren also argue that the Commission's role becomes more
important when the Member States are more heterogeneous because they are less likely
to all think the same way. Id. at 12. The authors conclude that non-voting Commission-
ers would reduce the Commission's legitimacy. Id. at 18.
11. Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, has said:
Experience shows that, for the large majority of countries, the European Com-
missioner is the person who reassures, who guarantees that the situation of his
or her country of origin is taken into consideration in Brussels and conversely
is the person who can explain to the government of his nationality all the ins
and outs of each dossier.
Agence Europe, Apr. 29, 2003, at 3. The Commission apparently now believes that
there should be one Commissioner per Member State. But before Nice Commissioners
took the view that the status quo was not an option and that the small States had to
accept both "senior" and "junior" Commissioners or rotation of nominees. The entire
discussion since before Nice has been confused because the Commission did not have a
consistent position and did not seem to understand clearly what is its raison ditre. See
generally TEMPLE LANG & GALLAGHER, ROLE OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 6; JOHN TEM-
PLE LANG, ACTION CENTRE FOR EUROPE, THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION AND THE EURO-
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traditional view is that all Commissioners should have
equal votes.
2. A Commission of more than fifteen members is too large
to be efficient. If small States insist on being able to nomi-
nate a Commissioner, half of the States should nominate
voting members of the Commission for five years, and the
other half should nominate non-voting Commissioners.
Commissioners' portfolios would not all be equally impor-
tant if there were twenty-eight or thirty Commissioners.
This formula emerged, for the first time, at the end of the
Convention.
Therefore, the key issue is whether the Commission should
be a small, efficient, but not representative body, or a larger but
clearly representative body. 12
B. Has the role of the Commission changed?
One of the reasons for the assumption that a smaller Com-
mission would be preferable is that it is assumed that the Com-
mission's policy-proposing role is no longer important since the
EU no longer needs to develop new policies (and that the Com-
mission should not be involved in developing new policies within
the spheres of foreign policy and justice). These assumptions
suggest that the law-enforcing, quasi-judicial tasks of the Com-
mission and its responsibilities for handling the EU budget
(which are, inaccurately, referred to as "executive" tasks) are
now its only tasks, and that a smaller Commission would perform
them more efficiently.
This current view has formed for several reasons:
1. There has been genuine and widespread ignorance about
why the Commission was invented.
2. There has been a deliberate effort, especially in the United
Kingdom, to downplay the Commission's role by describ-
ing it as a civil service, a secretariat, or an "executive"
which merely ought to be carrying out the instructions of
the Parliament or the Council.
PEAN PARLIAMENT (2000); JOHN TEMPLE LANG, EUROPAEUM, THE COMMISSION AND THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AFTER NICE (2001) [hereinafter TEMPLE LANG, EUROPAEM]; John
Temple Lang, How Much do the Smaller Member States Need the European Commission?, 39
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 315 (2002).
12. Commissioners are not "representatives" of the countries which nominated
them, but collectively represent the Union as a whole.
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3. The Commission's policy-proposing, law enforcing and
managerial functions, considered separately, would ideally
require three different institutional arrangements. Its pol-
icy-proposing tasks should be performed by a group com-
posed of one nominee policy-maker from each Member
State. Its law enforcement tasks should be performed by a
group of lawyers and economists; but just as it is accepted
that the Court of Justice should consist of one judge from
each Member State, it should be accepted that there ought
to be one Commissioner from each State for law enforce-
ment tasks. For budget and other managerial functions,
however, it is said that a smaller Commission would be
more efficient. This assumes that a smaller Commission,
with nominees from only half of the Member States at any
time, would generally be regarded as an impartial body.
This is a crucial assumption, and it is one that is most un-
likely to be correct.
4. There is a view that the Commission no longer needs to
propose new economic policies. This view assumes that
because the Single Market and the EU's other policies
have been completed, the EU will not need to develop any
new policies for any purpose either within the EU or in its
relations with the rest of the world. It is self-evident that
this view is incorrect. While a start has been made on most
of the policies which the EU should have, many of them
still are incomplete, and almost all of them need to be
kept up-to-date and adapted to changing circumstances.
With ten new Member States and more to come, and with
rapid changes in the world economy foreseeable, revised
policy proposals (rather than completely new policies) will
certainly be needed. In addition, the EU will continue to
need an impartial governmental body to handle interna-
tional economic negotiations on its behalf.
5. It is also taken for granted that the Commission should
continue to maintain all of its existing responsibilities.
It is assumed that the Commission should not have a signifi-
cant policy-proposing role in developing the EU's future com-
mon foreign and security policy. This is because several of the
large Member States believe that they are better qualified to con-
trol this policy themselves.
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III. THE COMMISSION. THE CONVENTION PROPOSAL
The proposal 3 is that each Commission should be ap-
pointed for five years, and that, from 2009 on, during each five-
year period only fifteen "European" Commissioners would have
votes, including the Commission President and the Minister for
Foreign Affairs. Member States' nominees would rotate on the
basis of equality between Member States. With twenty-five Mem-
ber States, this means that each State would have a nominee with
voting rights for ten out of every fifteen years. Since there will
be more States when the new regime comes into force (Bulgaria,
Romania and probably Croatia and Turkey will have joined by
then), the proportion of time during which each State would
have a voting nominee would be less than that, even by 2009.
The proposal is a compromise between the large States'
wish to have ten to fifteen Commissioners and the smaller Mem-
ber States' interest in having a Commission on which every State
would have a nominee with voting rights at all times.
The large Member States argue that a Commission of more
than fifteen voting members would be too large, that Commis-
sioners are not there to represent the interests of the States nom-
inating them (so that there does not need to be one from each
State), and that it is wrong to treat Luxembourg (population
400,000) in the same way as Germany (population 80 million) in
this respect.
A. Issues raised by the Convention's formula on the Commission
The Convention's proposals concerning the Commission
raise several questions:
1. Is it satisfactory to have a Commission with nominees of
only fifteen Member States as voting Commissioners?
2. Would having fifteen non-voting members be an improve-
ment?
3. Is it possible to have fifteen voting members who "reflect
satisfactorily the demographic and geographical range of
all the Member States"?14
4. Are the powers of selection and removal,"5 given to the
13. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1-25, OJ. C 169/1, at 13-14 (2003).
14. See id.
15. Id.
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President of the Commission, excessive?
5. What is the status of the President and the Minister within
the Commission?
1. The Convention's Formula on the Commission
The Protocol on Enlargement in the Nice Treaty said that
when the number of Member States reaches twenty-seven, the
number of Commissioners shall be less than the number of
Member States.16 The number was not specified, but the Com-
missioners would be chosen "according to a rotation system
based on the principle of equality"17 between States, and each
Commission shall "reflect satisfactorily the demographic and ge-
ographical range of all the Member States."1 " Article 25 of the
Draft Treaty repeats essentially the same phrases.
The number of voting Commissioners now envisaged by the
Convention is fifteen. No suggestions have yet been made, and
no mechanism or formula has been mentioned, to say how a
Commission of fifteen voting Commissioners could "reflect satis-
factorily" twenty-five or more very diverse Member States. Pre-
sumably, the President and Foreign Minister would be treated as
nominees of the States from which they came. 9
For purposes of illustration, assume a twenty-five member
Commission with fifteen voting members. This would mean that
at any one time, three-fifths of the States would have voting nom-
inee Commissioners. In the first Commission, three groups of
five States each would all have voting nominees. In the second
Commission, one of these groups, and the two other groups of
five States, would all have voting nominees. In the third Com-
mission, three of the four groups which had previously had vot-
ing nominees in only one period would again have voting nomi-
nees. When the fourth Commission would be set up, there
would be one group of States that would have had voting nomi-
16. See Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties es-
tablishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Protocol A, art. 4(2),
O.J. C 80/1, at 52 (2001).
17. Id.
18. Id. Protocol A, art. 4(3)(b), O.J. C 80/1, at 52 (2001).
19. If they were not treated in this way there would have to be rules to ensure that
there were no other voting Commissioners of the same nationality at the same time,
and the periods during which States would have no voting nominee would be longer
than envisaged in the text.
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nees in only one of the three previous periods. That group, and
two of the other groups, would have voting nominees in the
fourth Commission. As soon as any more Member States joined,
the rota would have to be reorganized, and the periods during
which each State would have no voting nominee would be
longer.
The composition of each Commission would also be subject
to the Draft Treaty's requirement that each Commission be com-
posed in such a way that every one of the combinations would
"reflect satisfactorily the demographic and geographical range
of all the Member States. 20
It is not mathematically possible to always have voting nomi-
nees of three large Member States as members of the Commis-
sion. The inextricable complexity of the five combinations of
twenty-five States should not be allowed to conceal the impossi-
bility of the objective called for by the Nice and Convention
clauses just quoted. It seems clear that the complexities and dif-
ficulties of the Convention's formula were not seen or under-
stood. In the Convention, as in Nice, an inadequately consid-
ered, simple-sounding, formula was adopted. It is obviously im-
possible to explain this clearly to the electorates.
2. Criticisms of the Convention's Formula
.It may be said that it does not matter if the voting Commis-
sioners do not "reflect satisfactorily" the diversity of the twenty-
five Member States, because there will be ten or more non-vot-
ing Commissioners as well. This argument is wrong, for at least
two reasons. First, the Convention text rightly requires the vot-
ing Commissioners to reflect the EU, and correctly, if cynically,
disregards the non-voting "Commissioners." Second, only the
voting Commissioners matter. A State which believes that its in-
terests have been disregarded by a Commission proposal or a
Commission decision will not be satisfied by being told that it
will have a voting nominee in five years' time, even if that were
true.
The first and most basic objection to the Convention
formula is that it misses the point. The issue is not whether the
States are treated equally, but whether the formula causes the
Commission to be (or to be regarded as) an unsatisfactory medi-
20. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1-25(3)(b), O.J. C 169/1, at 14 (2003).
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ator. If it does, then it would not matter that the States were all
treated equally, even if that were true. Unfortunately it is clear
that the Convention formula would prevent the Commission
from fulfilling its role satisfactorily. A Commission on which
two-fifths or more of the Member States have no voting nomi-
nees is not an impartial mediator, representative of the whole
EU, and equally independent of all the Member States. The fact
that the formula has been accepted suggests either that it was
not carefully considered, or that those who accepted it did not
understand the Commission's role in the Community method,
or did not think it important that the Commission would be un-
satisfactory. All three explanations are probably correct.
The Commission does not merely initiate or propose poli-
cies. It also acts as a facilitator and mediator between Member
States when they disagree, and between the Council and the Par-
liament when their views need to be reconciled, as they do in-
creasingly often in co-decision procedures. The Commission's
roles in these respects are essential to make the EU work
smoothly, and indeed to make it work at all. These tasks will be
more necessary than ever in the future with twenty-five or more
Member States. For these continuing roles the Commission
must be, and must be seen clearly to be, indisputably objective
and impartial in a way that a Commission composed of only fif-
teen voting members could not be.21
In addition:
- It is hard to imagine any large State accepting that the Com-
mission could possibly "reflect satisfactorily the demo-
graphic... range of all the Member States" if its nominee
had no vote.
- When the UK and either France or Germany (or any three
large States) are without voting nominees, it is impossible to
imagine that they will accept that the Commission "reflects"
them, adequately or at all.
- It is hard to imagine that Ireland, for example, would feel
"reflected" by a UK voting nominee, and if it did, that the
UK would reciprocate.
Whatever compromises might ultimately be devised, it is ob-
viously impossible to design any Commission of fifteen members
which would "reflect satisfactorily" an EU of twenty-five or more
21. See ROLE OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 21-25.
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very different States. This would mean that at any one time, the
Commission would lack the confidence of at least two-fifths of
the Member States. In the long term, this means that the Com-
mission, and therefore the Community method, will be consid-
ered unsatisfactory.
The second, simpler and fundamental, objection to both
the Nice Protocol and the Convention formula is "based on the
principle of equality." It is naive and unrealistic, however, to be-
lieve that a small Member State without a nominee is "equal," in
any meaningful sense, to a large Member State without a nomi-
nee. Much has been made of the fact that the six most populous
States (with over 40 million inhabitants each) represent seventy-
four percent of the EU population. Three large States repre-
senting thirty-five to forty percent of the population 22 cannot be
expected to accept that a Commission excluding their nominees
"reflects" the demographic range of all the States. Further, the
large Member States will ensure other ways for their interests to
be taken into account at all times while smaller States will be
unable to do this.
The argument of "legal equality" of States is a naive self-
deception, serving as a comfort blanket for small States which
refuse to see the harm done to the Community method and
their own interests by the Nice Treaty formula and the Conven-
tion formula. Indeed this single mistake seems to explain the
surprisingly widespread failure of some of the small States to un-
derstand the significance and ill-effects of the proposal. This
self-deception, however, is unlikely to last.
In all Member States with referenda on the new Constitu-
tional Treaty, popular support may depend on whether the
States have recovered their right to nominate a Commissioner at
all times. Non-voting "Commissioners" who have neither portfo-
22. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing repeatedly pointed out that Germany has a larger popu-
lation than California, and that Luxembourg and Malta have populations smaller than
Rhode Island. In Europe, apart from the six large States with seventy-four percent of
the population, there are eight States (Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Swe-
den, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) having populations of between 8 mil-
lion and 16 million, forming together nineteen percent of the total, and eleven smaller
States (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia,
Slovakia, Cyprus, and Malta) which only represent seven percent of the population.
But the Convention proposal means, among other odd results, that the three Baltic
States (8 million inhabitants) will always have one voting nominee in the Commission,
while the 80 million Germans will not.
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lios nor clearly established roles, and who have no right to be
involved in all of the Commission's work, clearly are not substi-
tutes for voting Commissioners.
The proposal is open to a number of specific criticisms:
- The non-voting Commissioner position is a mere gesture to
the smaller Member States. (It is so obviously unsatisfactory
that one suspects they are expected to reject it). It will be
difficult to recruit high-quality candidates for the non-vot-
ing posts, since their roles are so unclear. They cannot rely
on being appointed as voting Commissioners after five
years, since the State nominating them might have a differ-
ent government then, or might prefer to nominate a
stronger candidate who was not originally interested in the
non-voting position. The quality of non-voting Commis-
sioners will probably be lower than that of the average Com-
missioner at present. Even if the non-voting members
could explain EU affairs to national parliaments in different
Member States and gather information on behalf of the
Commission, the difficulty is that the non-voting members
would be explaining policies on which they had not voted,
about which they might not be fully informed, and with
which they might not agree. Moreover, there are better
ways of gathering information. Also, because non-voting
members will not have participated in the discussions, the
degree of solidarity between non-voting and voting Commis-
sioners will be lessened. Their interlocutors will know that
non-voting members are second-level Commissioners.
- Voting Commissioners will be unlikely to remain for a sec-
ond five-year period as non-voting members. For this rea-
son, the continuity, as well as the solidarity, of the Commis-
sion would be reduced.
- Without portfolios or the ability to vote, the function of the
non-voting Commissioners will be reduced to defending the
interests of the State that nominated them.
- Indeed, it is not clear what non-voting "Commissioners" will
do, since they will have neither portfolios nor votes. The
Commission will be reduced in size to make it more stream-
lined and efficient, and the more the non-voting members
try to do the work of full Commissioners, the more that pur-
pose will be defeated. Commissioners with portfolios and
votes, appointed to form a small team, will have no reason
to share their work with individuals who have neither. It is
not even clear if they would have their own staff and, if so,
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what that staff would do. In practice, non-voting "Commis-
sioners" are likely to spend a lot of time listening to lobby-
ists. There would be a continuing struggle between the
non-voting "Commissioners" trying to obtain influence, and
the voting Commissioners trying to keep the Commission
small and streamlined.
- The proposal is also open to the criticism that each voting
Commissioner will be expected in some way to safeguard
the interests of one or more of the States without voting
nominees, while all Commissioners should be acting only in
the general interest.
- The proposal would give States, in particular large Member
States, an excuse to object to Commission proposals and de-
cisions (e.g., on State aids)2" which they dislike on the
grounds that they had been adopted by a Commission on
which the nominee of the State in question had no vote.
They would be particularly reluctant to accept a Commis-
sion proposal if their non-voting nominees were known to
have disagreed with it, or if their nominees were not re-
garded as particularly influential or effective.
- The objection that the Convention formula in fact gives
more weight to the larger States is made more serious be-
cause the Convention also proposed a re-weighting of the
votes in the Council. Until now, smaller States had votes
out of proportion to their populations: the new Council
"double majority" voting formula (sixty percent of the EU
population and a majority of the States) gives much greater
power to the larger States than ever before. As the scope of
majority voting and co-decision by the Parliament was wid-
ened by the Convention and seems likely to widen further
in the IGC, the need for the safeguard provided by the
Commission (which is needed precisely because of majority
voting) becomes even greater.
- The objection to the Convention formula is only to the con-
cept of non-voting "Commissioners." "Senior" and 'junior"
Commissioners, in the sense that some would have broader
or more important responsibilities within the Commission,
could not be objected to. In effect, that exists informally
already.
- In other words, the proposal involves both the disadvantages
of "senior" and 'junior" Commissioners and the disadvan-
23. In 2001, State aids in the fifteen Member States amounted to 86 billion euro,
almost as much as the EU budget. The importance of effective control by the Commis-
sion of this flow of money is self-evident.
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tages of rotation of a reduced number of Commissioners
between the Member States.
All this has at least three other consequences. First, it low-
ers the status of the Commission, because at any time two-fifths
of the Member States will not have as much confidence in the
Commission as if their nominees had votes. Second, it reduces
the safeguard for the smaller Member States which has so far
been provided by a Commission composed of one voting Com-
missioner from each State.
This is not surprising. The Commission was the only institu-
tion which the large Member States wished to reduce in size.
They did not propose reducing the number of judges in the
Community Courts or the Members of the Court of Auditors,
below the number of Member States. The Commission was the
institution whose authority they wished to weaken. The U.K. was
frank about this, and the fact that this was the French objective
also became very clear. The argument that large Member States
ought to have voting nominees in the Commission at all times
showed that the large States did not want to agree to even formal
equality of States on paper in this respect.
This proposal is an unfortunate example of what the Con-
vention was intended to avoid: an ill-considered, illogical com-
promise instead of a rational legal construction. Nobody setting
out to write a Constitution would have devised such a complex,
unsatisfactory, and clumsy arrangement. This was partly due to
the fact that the institutional issues were the only ones which
were not carefully prepared and considered by a working group
within the Convention.24
The third, and less obvious, disadvantage of the Convention
proposal is that it will make it harder to find a suitable President
of the Commission. Unless the individual concerned remained
24. Apparently the Convention did not ask for a working group on institutional
questions, but that did not prevent the Praesidium from setting one up. Because the
Commission was never united on consistent and clear policy on its own composition
and appointment, the natural majority in the Praesidium in favour of the Commission
gradually broke up, and Mr. Dehaene in particular came to control what the Commis-
sion proposed. See KRPs'rY HUGHES, A DYNAMIc AND DEMOCRATIC EU OR MUDDLING
THROUGH AGAIN? ASSESSING THE EU's DRAFr CONSTITUTION (European Policy Institute
Network, Working Paper No. 8, 2003), available at http://www.ceps.be (rightly criticiz-
ing the inadequacy of the institutional debate in the Convention, and describing non-
voting Commissioners as "an unhappy compromise," and the overall institutional com-
promise as "a recipe for on-going turf-fighting and confusion"). Id. at 6, 13.
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on the Commission for fifteen years, potential Presidents would
be chosen only from those whose States had the right to nomi-
nate two voting Commissioners in succession. A potential Presi-
dent would be unlikely to accept a non-voting position even in
his or her first term, and it would be better to appoint as Presi-
dent someone who had previously been a Commissioner, al-
though this is not always understood.
A longer-term but even more serious consequence of the
unrepresentative nature of the Commission as envisaged by the
Convention is that the Commission's sole right to propose mea-
sures (which is essential to make majority voting acceptable) is
likely to be put into question. Parliament itself is a threat to the
Community method. Why should a plainly unrepresentative
body have the sole right of initiative, when the Parliament has
not? The answer (i.e., that the Commission safeguards the inter-
ests of minorities, which the Parliament cannot do) seems to
have been forgotten (and would be less true of an unrepresenta-
tive Commission). The lip service paid by the Convention to the
Community method will not recall it.
3. The Convention Formula on the Commission:
Consequences on the Next Enlargement
It is unlikely that the next enlargement of the EU will in-
volve five new Member States. Instead, it is likely to involve only
Bulgaria, Romania25 , and perhaps Turkey. At that point it will
be necessary to decide which Member States will be the first to
lose their right to nominate a voting Commissioner, out of or-
der. Already the Convention formula leads to ten Member
States being the first to lose their voting nominees in the first
five-year period. After each future enlargement, several more
States will lose their right to nominate a voting Commissioner in
each alternate period, and relative equality between States can-
not be restored until there are thirty States (and this equality will
be lost again, if and when there are more than thirty).
A formula which necessarily and repeatedly gives rise to ine-
quality and jockeying for position is profoundly unsatisfactory.
This illustrates in another way why the formula "rotation on the
25. See Declaration attached to the Protocol on the representation of citizens in
the European Parliament and the weighting in the European Council and the Council
of Ministers, July 18, 2003, O.J. C 169/99 (2003).
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basis of strict equality between Member States" is naive, ill-con-
sidered, and certain to lead to undignified and undesirable se-
cret bargains instead of open and fair government.
Inevitably this kind of secret bargain will weaken the Com-
mission, because it will involve the nomination arrangements in
controversy which will exasperate, and be incomprehensible to,
electorates.
IV. THE COMMISSION: LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF TWO
POLICY-MAKING "METHODS"
The reduction in the number of voting Commissioners, and
the resulting (and presumably intended) reduction in the stand-
ing of the Commission which will result, has serious long-term
implications. As already explained, a fully representative Com-
mission equally independent of all the Member States is essential
to the "Community method." For some years to come, the EU
will take economic decisions according to the Community
method, and foreign policy and security measures according to
the intergovernmental method. The devaluation of the Com-
mission necessarily devalues the Community method, and makes
it less likely that, whenever the EU decides to make all kinds of
decisions by one method, the Community method (or some vari-
ation of it) will be adopted.
This is extremely unfortunate. When the European Com-
munity was organized in the 1950s, the Community method was
considered essential for several reasons. First, as already ex-
plained, it was necessary to make majority voting on important
matters acceptable, both in principle and in practice. Second, it
was necessary to have a fully representative and independent
Commission in order to create an institutional structure in
which large and small Member States could co-exist satisfactorily.
That had never previously been possible, and is not now possi-
ble, on an intergovernmental basis. Devaluing the Commission
and the Community method devalues the key feature which
made the Community effective and which made it acceptable
even to Member States which were outvoted. What the Conven-
tion has unfortunately agreed is likely to make the EU both inef-
fective (because States without voting nominees will be less likely
to accept Commission proposals and decisions) and unaccept-
able (because States will be less likely to accept being outvoted in
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relation to Commission proposals which they will consider were
drawn up without adequate safeguards for their interests).
When the time ultimately comes for the EU to adopt a sin-
gle method for taking all the kinds of decisions which it is au-
thorized to take, it is important for the smaller Member States
that the Commission and the Community method then in opera-
tion be suitable for adoption, and has not been devalued.
It may also be important for the large Member States. At
that time there will be at least six, perhaps seven, large Member
States, out of a total of some thirty or more States. Insofar as
there is majority voting, it will be entirely possible for several
large Member States to be outvoted. Even under the Conven-
tion's Draft Treaty, a minority of Member States could veto an
EU measure only if they contain forty percent of the total EU
population. If the EU population is 500 million, it would need
States with a total population of 200 million to veto a measure.
At present, Germany, France and the United Kingdom together
have a total population of only 180 million. It is unlikely that a
measure which is seriously unacceptable to those three States
would be adopted by a majority vote. But it is possible and noth-
ing in the Convention prevents it. There must be more majority
voting in the future than there has been in the past. The large
Member States may ultimately come to regard the Community
method and the Commission more favorably than they do at pre-
sent.
What is more likely is that one or even two of these three
large States would find themselves in a minority which was not
large enough to have a veto. That might have been the situation
if the difference of opinion over the war in Iraq in 2003 had
been put to a vote under majority voting rules.
Governments tend to believe that they know best, and that
democratic discussion is time-consuming, unnecessary, and may
be awkward. If governments have two methods of making deci-
sions, one involving the Commission and the Parliament and the
other involving neither, they will always be tempted to use the
latter method if possible. The more important and controversial
the problem, the greater will be this temptation.
Of course, in the foreseeable future, common foreign and
security policy measures will be subject to unanimity. This has
unfortunate consequences. A common foreign and security pol-
2004] THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE 565
icy which is not based on the Community method is likely to be
handicapped in at least three ways. First, unanimity will be nec-
essary in many areas in which majority voting should be accept-
able if the Community method was used. Second, it will be nec-
essary, to reduce the inconvenience of unanimity, to allow States
to abstain from voting and from involvement with measures and
policies which they dislike. The result is likely to be that foreign
and security policy measures, in the name of the Union, are es-
sentially adopted by those of the larger Member States which
agree. That may be as much as can be expected. But it is not a
real common policy. That, if and when it becomes a practical
possibility, would involve the Community method. Third, the in-
tergovernmental method is not subject to democratic control,
which tends to make foreign policy measures less acceptable.
So the downgrading of the Commission and the Commu-
nity method has made it more difficult to have an effective com-
mon foreign and security policy. The unwillingness of the large
Member States to give the Commission its normal role in foreign
and security policy postpones and weakens such a policy. In this
respect, intergovernmentalism is self-defeating. It is likely to cre-
ate arrangements which are neither satisfactory nor permanent.
Until the Community method is applied to common foreign and
security policy, the EU, unlike any other organization, will have
two distinct sets of institutions and procedures, one for foreign
policy, the other for economic and social policy. This is not a
rational structure, and the EU will never have a satisfactory or
permanent structure until it is rationalized. It was never realistic
for the Convention to envisage majority voting on common for-
eign and security issues. But it was reasonable to look forward to
the day when it would be possible, and it will be possible only on
the basis of the Community method. A more far-sighted body
than the Convention would have strengthened the Commission
and the Community method. If this had been done, the EU
would have been made more acceptable in the short term and,
in the long term, more effective as well. It is disappointing, but
not surprising, that this has not been done. The Convention, a
success in many respects, has failed very seriously in this one.
V. THE COMMISSION: THE ALTERNATIVES
It has been said that either Commissioners need not have
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any relationship with the State which nominated them (so their
nationality is irrelevant), or a relationship (however described)
exists. If a relationship does exist, as the small States believe,
then it is said to be unreasonable that the five smallest States
(Slovenia, Estonia, Luxembourg, and the two Mediterranean is-
lands, the total population of which is less than 5 million) should
have the same number of nominees as the six largest States (to-
tal population over 300 million). (This disregards the fact that
Commissioners are not representatives, but are there to make
the Commission representative of the whole, diverse Union, and
to give small States confidence in the Commission). This version
of the argument suggests that the Commission should always in-
clude a nominee of each of the large Member States, but not
necessarily a nominee of each of the smaller States. This is of
course not the Convention formula, but one which openly favors
the large Member States. The Nice Treaty and the Convention
formulas favor the large Member States, but do so less openly.
The Convention proposal may be regarded as so unsatisfac-
tory that the small Member States refuse to accept it. If that hap-
pens, the large Member States are likely to propose a Commis-
sion on which each of them would always have a nominee, and
on which the small Member States would share, in some way, the
right to nominate the other Commissioners. That would, of
course, entirely give up even the formal equality between the
Member States, and make the Commission less independent of
some States than of others.
There are three other alternatives which would be better
than the Convention proposal. The best, of course, is a Commis-
sion with the number of Commissioners equal to the number of
Member States, all having votes. This is the only way which will
ensure that the Commission is fully representative of the EU as a
whole and is equally independent of all Member States. This
solution is, however, opposed by the large Member States, osten-
sibly on the grounds that it would make the Commission un-
wieldy and inefficient, more probably on the ground that it
would give the Commission too much authority. Unless the
small States understand the reasons for the Community method
more clearly than they apparently have done so far, they will not
win this argument..
A second alternative would be to have two Commissioners
nominated by each of the large Member States, as at present,
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and one nominated by each of the smaller States, all Commis-
sioners having votes.
A third alternative, which could be combined with one
Commissioner per State, would be to have each Commissioner
nominated by two or three Member States. This has several ad-
vantages:
- It would increase the independence of the Commissioners
from the Member States nominating them.
- It would improve the quality of the Commissioners, because
the nominees would have to be acceptable to several gov-
ernments rather than only one. Nominations could no
longer be merely rewards for less successful politicians. A
mechanism for improving the quality of Commissioners
would be better than exhortations.
- It would cause governments to compete by putting forward
the nominees most attractive to other governments, rather
than the candidates most convenient for domestic, perhaps
party-political, reasons.
- Insofar as Commissioners in practice defend the interests of
the States which nominate them, it is better for a Commis-
sioner to have two or three States' interests to safeguard
than only one.
- The Commission would therefore be restored to what it was
intended to be, an institution with continuity representing
the whole and acting only in the interests of the whole.
- If necessary, the size of the Commission could be adjusted.
Before Nice, the idea that Commissioners should each be
nominated by two or more States was informally suggested. The
objection then was that it would facilitate a move to a situation in
which there would be less than one Commissioner per Member
State. (The odd idea of non-voting "Commissioners" had not
then been suggested). That situation is now envisaged by the
Convention formula. Two-State or three-State nominations
would certainly be better than non-voting "Commissioners."
A Commission, each member of which had to be nominated
by two or three governments, could be appointed, in essence, in
two ways. The EU could be divided into a series of groups of two
or three States, on a lasting basis, and each group would decide
on its nominee. Each large Member State would presumably be
in a different group, and no doubt its nominees would be most
often nominated by its group.
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Alternatively, there would be no fixed groups, and each gov-
ernment would have to find a candidate acceptable to any one
or two other governments. This would put all the Member
States, in this respect, on an equal footing.
Each method would, of course, give rise to bargaining of
various kinds. The groups, in the first method, would not be
easy to choose, but the difficulty would not be insuperable. The
scope for informal and secret bargaining under the second
method might be excessive, and might lead to cynicism.
Such a system would provide the main advantage of the
Convention formula - higher quality Commissioners - by a
much more democratic process, which would avoid putting ex-
cessive power into the hands of the President of the Commis-
sion. But unless there were always as many Commissioners as
there were States, it might lead to the large States always nomi-
nating a Commissioner, and not sharing the nominations with
other States. That would be almost as unsatisfactory as non-vot-
ing "Commissioners."
VI. THE POWERS PROPOSED FOR THE PRESIDENT OF
THE COMMISSION
With very little explanation, the Convention suggested that
the powers of the President of the Commission should be greatly
increased. The President is to select one voting member of the
Commission from lists of three nominees put forward by the
States entitled to nominate voting Commissioners. The Presi-
dent would also appoint non-voting Commissioners from the
other Member States. The President would also have power to
require a Commissioner to resign, apparently without giving any
reason and without judicial review. (At present, the Treaty pro-
vides that a Commissioner may be removed from office for inca-
pacity or misconduct).
Giving the Commission President the discretionary power to
select Commissioners from lists of three put forward by the
States whose turn it is to nominate voting Commissioners will
tend to improve the quality of Commissioners. Nevertheless,
since only one State will have nominated each Commissioner ul-
timately chosen, this does nothing to make Commissioners more
independent of the States which nominated them. But it will
2004] THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE 569
lessen the solidarity of the Commission and end the present
equality between the President and the other Commissioners.
The combined effect of the Parliament's power to approve
(not really to choose) 26 the President and the President's power
to choose and dismiss Commissioners (and because the Presi-
dent "shall be responsible to. the European Parliament for the
activities of the Commissioners") is that the Parliament would
have much greater power over individual Commissioners, and
over the Commission as a whole, than it has at present. For ex-
ample, if a majority of members of the Parliament believed that
the Competition Commissioner is too strict on State aid, even
though State aid decisions are taken by the voting Commission-
ers collectively, Parliament could tell the President to dismiss the
Commissioner in question. The President would have the
power, and perhaps the political duty, to dismiss him, although
to do so would be contrary to the principle of Commission soli-
darity.
So, quite apart from the question27 of whether the Conven-
tion proposal gives the President, as an individual, too much
power, the proposal interferes with the independence and soli-
darity of the Commission as a whole, even in connection with its
decision-making powers, and with the independence of individ-
ual voting Commissioners.
It is impossible to know how future Presidents would use
their powers to select Commissioners from Member States' lists,
or to know how States will use their duty to propose three
names. It is important, however, to understand that the Presi-
dent's power conceals, but does not resolve, the impossibility of
having fifteen voting Commissioners who genuinely "reflect" a
Union of twenty-five or more States, and it does nothing to re-
store the Commission's status as an impartial mediator. There is
a basic contradiction between the approval of the Commission
President by the Parliament, to increase the "legitimacy" of the
Commission, and simultaneously making the Commission "rep-
resentative," in any real sense, of only half of the Member States
at a time.
26. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1-26, OJ. C 169/1, at 14 (2003) (merely
allowing the Parliament to approve or reject a candidate proposed by the Council).
27. DEHOUSSE ET AL., NOTRE EUROPE RESEARCH AND EUROPEAN ISSUES, THE INSTITU-
TIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A THIRD FRANCO-GERMAN W'WAY? (2003).
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VII. THE REASONS FOR THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT
THE COMMISSION
There seem to have been essentially two reasons for the con-
troversy about the Commission, apart from a simple wish to re-
duce the power of any institution independent of governments.
The first reason is that although many people paid lip service to
the Community method, not all of them were very clear about its
rationale or about the kind of Commission needed to carry it
out. Some Members of the European Parliament in particular
saw no reason why the Commission should be independent of
the Parliament, and even said that it should accept specific in-
structions from the Parliament "like any government." Such
comments could only be made by people who did not under-
stand why the Commission, to fulfil its role, must be indepen-
dent of majorities in the Council and the Parliament. The Par-
liament, of course, is seeking to extend its powers in any direc-
tion which may become available, but such comments suggest
that the speakers had failed to understand that the EU institu-
tions should not be thought of as if they were the institutions of a
State, or even a confederation.
This misunderstanding or ignorance was largely due to the
fact that the rationale of the Community method, and in particu-
lar for the nature and role of the Commission, had not been
sufficiently explained, either when the EC Treaty was written in
1957 or since, to have become generally understood and ac-
cepted. If asked, many people would merely say that the Com-
mission's role was to conceive and design policies in the interests
of the Union as a whole, taking a broader view than any govern-
ment could be expected or relied on to take. This is, of course,
true and important, but it fails to take account of the mediator
role of the Commission in protecting minority interests, which is
more familiar in mediation theory than in political science.
The second basic reason why the current controversy over
the composition of the Commission is that the members of the
present Commission have shown surprisingly little collective un-
derstanding of the importance and the nature of the institu-
tional questions presented in recent years. They had not agreed
on a clear understanding about what kind of Commission was
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necessary, and why.2s Before Nice, they adopted a document
saying that the Commission should be composed of less than
one Commissioner per Member State, apparently without con-
sidering the significance of this suggestion for smaller Member
States, or for the Commission's role as mediator. The reason
given (that only in a smaller Commission could all Commission-
ers be sure to obtain portfolios of similar importance) was insuf-
ficient tojustify such a radical and unsatisfactory conclusion, and
suggests that the Commissioners understood their personal rival-
ries better than they understood the role of their institution, in
particular for the protection of smaller States. As a result of the
Commission's uncertainty about its own raison ditre, the Com-
mission failed to provide intellectual leadership on institutional
issues in the Convention, and the initiative passed into the hands
of those who either did not understand its raison d'tre or did not
wish to act on it or strengthen it. In any event, it was not until
after the Convention had ended that Romano Prodi announced,
apparently for the first time, that there should be one Commis-
sioner nominated by each Member State. Mr. Prodi and Mr.
Michel Barnier said this again in August 2003, and said that it
was the view of a majority of the Commission.2 9
In September 2003, the Commission belatedly adopted a pa-
per on, among other things, the question of its composition.30
The paper says that non-voting Commissioners would destroy
28. See TEMPLE LANG, EUROPAEUM, supra note 11, at 14-15, 26-27; John Temple
Lang & Eamonn Gallagher, What Sort of European Commission does the European Union
Need? I EUROPARATrSLI¢ TIDSKRIFr 81, 85-86 (2002). See also Commission Communica-
tion: A Project for the European Union, May 22, 2002, COM (02) 247 final (referring
to the Community method as having "to be adapted to the new requirements," but does
not say what the method is, why it is important, or how it needs to be adapted). Even
more surprisingly, it envisages qualified majority voting on CFSP measures without say-
ing that they must be based on Commission proposals in accordance with the Commu-
nity method. Id. at 4.
29. At the end of August 2003 the Finnish Government submitted a report to the
Finnish Parliament in which it insisted on the need for a voting commissioner from
each Member State at all times. See STATSRADETS REDOG(RELSE TILL RIKSDAGEN OM
KONVENTETS RESULTAT OCH FORBEREDELSERNA INFOR REGERINGSKONFERENSEN (August
2003).
30. See Commission Communication: A Constitution for the Union: Opinion of
the Commission, pursuant to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Con-
ference of representatives of the Member States' governments convened to revise the
Treaties, Sept. 17, 2003, COM (03) 548 final [hereinafter A Constitution for the Union]
(setting out, in Annexes 2 and 3, proposals for the composition and organization of the
Commission).
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the collegial or collective nature of the institution, and lead to a
loss of its legitimacy. The Commission should include a Com-
missioner from each Member State with the same rights and ob-
ligations. Some decisions should be delegated, and Commis-
sioners would all decide only issues of strategic and political im-
portance. This view rejects both the Convention and the Treaty
of Nice formulas. The Commission's Opinion says that the Con-
vention formula is "complicated, muddled and inoperable."
Since the Commission itself was not clear, it is perhaps un-
derstandable that the politicians in Nice allowed themselves to
be bullied (apparently the word is not too strong) into accepting
an unspecified reduction in the size of the Commission. Some
of them apparently believed, quite unjustifiably, that the result
would be a Commission of only one or two Members less than
the number of States, a result which was never a serious possibil-
ity. After Nice, politicians who understood that a serious mistake
had been made (both from the viewpoint of the Commission
itself and from that of the smaller Member States) encountered
difficulty in that they were seeking to re-open an agreement
reached in Nice. As a result, politicians who went to Nice saying
they would insist on keeping the right to nominate a Commis-
sioner at all times have since been saying, unconvincingly, that
having a non-voting "Commissioner" is satisfactory.
The confusion in the Commission's understanding of its
own role was also shown by the suggestion, made initially by the
Commission itself but supported by France, that the Commission
should be responsible to both the Council and the Parliament.
That suggestion failed to understand that the independence of
the Commission from both the other institutions is essential to
its mediator role, and is based on the fact that it is appointed by
one body (essentially the Council) but removable by another
(the Parliament). The suggestion was open to another obvious
objection: what would happen if the Council wished to remove
the Commission and the Parliament wanted to keep it, or vice
versa?
[Vol. 27:544
2004] THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE 573
VIII. THE INTERESTS OF LARGE MEMBER STATES IN
ENSURING THAT THE EUROPEAN UNION REMINS
ACCEPTABLE TO THE SMALLER
MEMBER STATES
Even if the large Member States believe, as they apparently
do, that their interests do not require a Commission where they
would have a voting nominee at all times, they should be con-
cerned about the Convention proposal. The EU is a voluntary
association, and a voluntary association can last only if it remains
acceptable to all its Member States. It has already been ex-
plained that a satisfactory mediator institution is necessary to
make majority voting acceptable to Member States which are
outvoted. If all the Member States were unsatisfied with the
Commission as a mediator, they would be less willing to accept
majority voting, without which the EU cannot function. Both
small and large States have interests rather than affections, and
the EU must cater to those interests. Under the Convention pro-
posals, almost forty percent of the population of the EU can be
outvoted. Such a large number of people will accept being out-
voted only if they are satisfied that the institutional structure pro-
vides them with adequate safeguards.
In a very diverse association, majority voting is acceptable in
the long run only with safeguards. The only institutional safeguard
is the Commission. That is why, in the long term, it is crucial for
the Community method and for the continued acceptance of
the EU in the smaller Member States, that the Commission be
always clearly and obviously fully representative of all Member
States, as well as fully independent from them. This result can
never be achieved with a Commission where only fifteen Com-
missioners have votes at any one time. The biggest problem fac-
ing the Convention is the great difference in sizes of various
Member States. The size of the Council and Parliament must be
based on the size of the Member States' populations. Thus, the
Commission is the only institution which can safeguard the inter-
ests of a small State which happens to be in a minority on a par-
ticular issue.
The large Member States are adequately represented in the
Council and Parliament and do not need the Commission as
much as small States. The large States would be wise to realize
that the Convention proposal goes too far to reduce the influ-
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ence of, and the safeguards for, the small States. This would be
true, in the long term, even if the large States had been more
tactful in the introduction of the changes in the Convention.
Even great tact and diplomacy could not have concealed the un-
satisfactory nature of a Commission on which two-fifths or more
of the Member States (the same proportion that can be outvoted
in the Council) had no voting nominees for five years at a time.
Treating large and small States equally on paper is no solution to
this problem.
IX. A FULL-TIME, LONG-TERM PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
Several large Member States maintain that the present six-
month Presidencies, even with the help of the last and next Pres-
idents in a "troika," make continuity impossible. Most smaller
States strongly oppose this view.
It is now suggested that a long-term, full-time President"
should preside at Councils, give added weight to the external
representation of the EU, and inform the Parliament about the
Council's work. It is not suggested that he would be subject to
any democratic control, and it is not clear to whom he would be
accountable.
This would work only if there already were a consensus
about clearer European policies - it would not do much to
bring them about. Clearer European policies can best be
brought about, if at all, by using the Commission to devise com-
promises. Yet the large States which are proposing a Council
President are doing so because they do not want to strengthen
the Commission.
A Council President not armed with any agreed European
policy could hardly remain silent, but would certainly say what
the large States wanted. In practice, such a President would be
accountable only to them. In the absence of clear rules, the
large States will have disproportionate influence, which will be
exercised informally, in private.
A full-time long-term Council President would be outside
the framework of the existing institutions (because he would not
be a regular member of the Council), whether he would have his
31. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1-21(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 12 (2003). See also A
Constitution for the Union, supra note 30, at para. 14.
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own staff, and whether his role would be clearly separated from
that of the Commission.
The main arguments against a long-term, full-time Presi-
dent of the Council are:
1. There is no substantial proposal for democratic control
over the Council President, or for his election by demo-
cratic process.
2. The President of the Council would inevitably interfere
with the "Foreign Minister," and probably also with the
President of the Commission.
3. If the Council President's position was full-time, he would
inevitably duplicate the work of the Commission President,
or conflict with it. There would be two EU Presidents, and
institutionalised rivalry between them.
4. Assurances of equality between large and small States in
the choice of an effective President of the Council are na-
ive and unrealistic.
5. The composition of the Council changes when govern-
ments change, and a President acceptable to all or most
governments initially might cease to be acceptable after
several years.
It is difficult to disagree with the comment that the initial
version of this proposal was part of a "hostile take-over bid by
supporters of an intergovernmental union,"32 a proposal "with
objectives that are either undesirable or at present unattaina-
ble, 3 3 and "the apotheosis of... intergovernmentalism ....
The final Convention formula is an imprecise and diluted ver-
sion of the initial proposal.
X. A 'EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTER?"
The Convention proposes that a "European Minister for
Foreign Affairs '3 5 should replace the present High Representa-
32. JOHN TEMPLE LANG, THE FEDERAL TRUST FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, THE
CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE - So FAR 5 (2003) (quoting Graham Watson,
MEP).
33. Id. (quoting Christopher Patten)
34. Peter Sutherland, Groupement d'etudes et de recherches: Notre Europe, Extract from
the Address of Peter D Sutherland, President of the European Policy Centre Advisory
Council at its Annual Meeting, at http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/pages/Contrib2-en.
htm (Oct. 11, 2002).
35. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1-27, O.J. C 169/1, at 14 (2003).
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tive and the Commissioner for External Relations. He or she
would be both a member - in some sense - of the Commission
and an officer of the Council. It is suggested, in effect, that he
would be responsible to the Commission on some issues, but re-
sponsible to the Council on others. There is no suggestion that
he or she would be democratically accountable to the Parlia-
ment.
Since Commissioners are required to be independent, and
are required to act collegially, such a dual role would not be fully
compatible with the concept of the Commission. To ensure
their independence, Commissioners are appointed by the Coun-
cil and removed by the Parliament and they cannot be responsi-
ble to or removable by another institution.
There are a few reasons for having a "Foreign Minister."
One reason is to provide a spokesperson for the EU on foreign
policy matters. This is a desirable role, but there is no guidance
on who is best suited to it. If he or she were a Member of the
Commission and had no other office, no difficulty would arise.
But another reason for having a "Foreign Minister" is tacitly
to take external relations issues away from the Commission and
to transfer them to the Council; in other words, Mr. Patten's suc-
cessor would be downgraded and Mr. Solana's successor and the
Council's influence both would be upgraded. This would be a
political, and probably also a legal, change. This obvious result
of the proposal to have a Foreign Minister represents real
change. A Treaty provision to this effect would reduce the exclu-
sive competence of the EU in "commercial policy" matters, and
deprive small States of the protection given by the Community
method and the requirement of a balanced Commission propo-
sal. If the three pillars were entirely abolished (which the Con-
vention text does not really do), it would mean applying the
Community method, including the Commission's exclusive
power to propose measures, to CFSP and justice and home af-
fairs. But the Commission is not being given the power to pro-
pose CFSP measures. Introducing the post of the "Foreign Min-
ister," as a quasi-officer of the Council, reduces the Commis-
sion's role.
In other words, the Foreign Minister idea is another effort
to reduce the influence of the Commission, and another part of
the contest between intergovernmentalism and the three large
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States, and the Community method, which safeguards the small
States. The crucial issue is who the Foreign Minister would take
orders from and who would appoint and dismiss him or her. In-
sofar as the Council instructed him or her, the Council would
decide CFSP, with no need for a Commission proposal. If the
Foreign Minister were only a member of the Commission, the
Commission, acting collegially, would give him or her initial in-
structions and the Minister would follow the Council's decisions
when the Council adopted, with or without modifications, the
Commission's proposals.
If the Council's instructions conflicted with the proposals or
policy of the Commission, the Minister would be in an impossi-
ble position if he or she were a member of the Commission. If
the Minister were not a member of the Commission, but simply
the servant of the Council, he or she would simply follow Coun-
cil instructions. The Commission would be sidelined. It would
not be possible for anyone who was both a Commissioner and an
officer of the Council, to reconcile these two duties unless the
views of the two institutions coincided.
Having a Foreign Minister who was part of both institutions
would cause Commission-controlled money to become subject to
the Council instead. It has already been suggested that Commis-
sion offices outside the EU should be put under the control of
the Council.
Any arrangement, by which the Foreign Minister belongs to
two institutions simultaneously, must necessarily be a compro-
mise difficult in practice and confusing in theory. The present
structure, with one or more Commissioners for foreign eco-
nomic policy and one High Representative for non-economic
foreign relations, is actually better than one "Foreign Minister"
would be, because the responsibilities of each and their source
of instructions is clear. The only objection is that the lines of
demarcation inevitably are unclear or overlap, and there is an
apparent duplication of functions. The Foreign Minister would
have a different kind of difficulty. The Foreign Minister concept
shows that it is not satisfactory to try to combine the Community
method and the intergovernmental method.
This is, once again, the result of forgetting that the raison
d'etre of the Commission is not to be a kind of inflated civil ser-
vice, but a separate institution, with a separate, limited, but nev-
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ertheless valuable, policy-proposing role and responsibility,
which requires its members to be independent from the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council.
XI. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
The Convention proposal says that the "Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs, for the field of common foreign and security
policy, and the Commission, for other fields of external action,
may submit joint proposals to the Council."36 It also provides
that the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall consult the Parliament,
shall ensure that its views are duly taken into consideration, and
shall keep it regularly informed.3" These are almost the only ref-
erences to either the Commission or the Parliament in the provi-
sions on common foreign and security policy. These clauses
have several serious implications.
First, the Commission is essentially excluded from common
foreign and security policy. It is not merely that the Commission
does not have the exclusive right to propose measures, as it has
in the economic sphere under the Community method. It has
no right to propose foreign and security measures at all. The
safeguards which the Community method provides are excluded
and there are no "checks and balances."
It may be said that the Commission is getting the power to
veto a proposal of the Minister in the sphere of foreign and se-
curity policy. This is substantially incorrect, because the Council
in this sphere does not act on Commission proposals, and the
Council may give the Minister whatever instructions it wishes.
Essentially, therefore, the Minister and the Commission each
have its own sphere and are not equals.
The second consequence is that there is no democratic con-
trol over the foreign and security policy. The Parliament cannot
provide this control because it does not appoint or remove the
Minister or the Council. National parliaments also cannot pro-
vide this control. At most, they could censure or remove their
own government representative. Furthermore, there is no judi-
cial control.
36. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 111-194(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 66 (2003).
37. See id. art. 111-205(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 68 (2003). The Parliament may ask
questions of the Council and the Minister, or make recommendations to them, and
shall debate the common foreign and security policy. Id.
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A foreign and security policy developed intergovern-
mentally without the safeguards of either democratic control or
the Community method is inconsistent with the claim that the
Convention text has made the Union, overall, more democratic.
The clauses also imply that the Union is not intended ever to
move to the Community method in foreign and security policy.
If that was intended, the Commission should have been given a
non-exclusive right to propose measures for that policy.
These are serious objections to what is proposed. But it may
also be useful to consider how the common foreign and security
policy will work formally, on the basis of unanimity and without
the help of a mediator institution.
If any Member State or group of Member States is free to
propose any foreign policy measure, it is likely that measures will
be proposed which are unbalanced or which do not adequately
reflect the views or the interests of other Member States. Even if
unanimity is needed, it may be obtained by bullying or bribery,
or by the "linkage" of concessions on unrelated issues. None of
these techniques is likely to lead to policies which are well
thought out in the interests of the whole Union, or which are
widely accepted and approved. Since several proposals may be
put forward on any given subject - none of them designed in
the interests of the whole Union and none of them designed by
an impartial mediator - time will be spent in trying to reconcile
rival texts. This will not lead to either clarity or efficiency. Blocs
are likely to form, and minimal measures will be put forward by
States reluctant to see any action taken. Council negotiations
would be more of a tug-of-war between competing national inter-
ests than they are at present. Small Member States are unlikely
to have their views accepted by large States unless they can be
shown to be well thought out and objectively sound, and the
most effective way of proving that would be to have them
adopted by an impartial body such as the Commission.
It is true, of course, that a small and unrepresentative Com-
mission would be less able to fulfil the mediator role in foreign
policy than a fully representative Commission. But that is also
true of economic policy, and is an argument for having a repre-
sentative Commission, not an argument for doing without the
safeguard of a mediator. Still less is it an argument for having no
democratic control.
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It is also true that the Commission has never had the exclu-
sive right to propose foreign policy measures. But it had a non-
exclusive right to do so, and the limits on its powers mattered
less when common foreign policy was an aspiration and not a
reality. As foreign policy becomes a reality, the institutional de-
fects in its formulation will become more serious.
The absence of democratic control and of safeguards for
minority interests is particularly worrying in light of the fre-
quently expressed wish that the Convention draft should be
adopted and should not be amended for many years. Such an
unsatisfactory text might be acceptable as a step towards a better
solution in a not-too-distant future. But it is not acceptable as a
permanent regime.
The third consequence of the relevant provision - Article
III-18938 - is also serious. It means that the Commission may
make a proposal for a commercial policy measure only with the
agreement of the Minister. This is a retrograde step, because it
means that the Council cannot even consider a Commission pro-
posal unless it is approved by one individual who is not even a
normal member of the Commission. This takes the commercial
policy of the EU out of the Community method and makes it
essentially intergovernmental.
This is not, unfortunately, a mere technicality. It is easy to
visualize that the Commission might want to propose a trade-
liberalizing measure in a new WTO round of negotiations, and
that the Council might instruct the Minister to prevent it being
formally proposed because some of the large Member States do
not want the Commission's proposal to lead to changes in the
Common Agricultural Policy, or do not want to benefit some
other countries in the world. If this happened, the Commis-
sion's proposal would not become formally known and discussed
and, because it was a commercial policy issue, no Member State
could take it over and propose it for consideration.
In short, the common foreign and security policy proposals
are the worst of all worlds - no Community method, no demo-
cratic or judicial control, and no suggestion that any will be in-
troduced in the future.
38. See id. art. 111-194(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 66 (2003).
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XII. GENERAL COMMENTS
- The division between the large Member States and the
smaller ones has become a central issue. This is similar to the
division between intergovernmentalists and Community method
supporters. It is underlying the difficulty over the President of
the Council (if CFSP were based on Community method, this
would be less problematic). It underlies the difficulty over the
number of Commissioners, since States without voting Commis-
sioners will not be equal. By contrast, the election of the Com-
mission President and the status of the "Foreign Minister," are
more technical and less controversial issues.
- If CFSP ended up largely in the hands of the large Member
States, small States presumably would be able to opt out, and the
large States already have the power to act without EU auspices.
- The Council President and the Foreign Minister issues in-
volve variations on intergovernmentalism, which in any case will
be the method used for foreign policy for the immediate future.
But the issue of the size of the Commission, and to a lesser ex-
tent, the issue of the election and powers of the Commission
President, are crucial because they affect the soundness and ac-
ceptability of the Community method.
- If unanimity is required for important decisions on com-
mon foreign and security policy, it is now clear that on at least
some important issues, there may not be agreement between
France and Germany on one side, and the United Kingdom on
the other.
If, however, unanimity is not required, and qualified major-
ity voting is possible, there is at least some possibility that France
could be outvoted. Even today, France, Germany, Belgium, and
Luxembourg would all have to vote together to veto a decision
requiring a qualified majority. In the future, three large States
(or some other combination) will be needed to exercise a veto.
It is unclear, at present, that France would accept a foreign pol-
icy regime in which it might be outvoted. It is clear, however,
that France wishes to have arrangements under which it and
other like-minded States could act together without the consent
of the other Member States.
- It is now clear how a foreign policy primarily influenced by
France would look. It is important to understand what lies be-
hind the increasingly assertive attitude of France. This is
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France's last and best chance to build a European foreign policy
construction in which it can expect to predominate, and which
would be independent of the United States. (U.S. policy on Iraq
and other issues has made many European governments less will-
ing to follow U.S. leadership on foreign policy issues). This is
why recent French statements and tactics have been designed to
oblige European States to take sides between France and the
United States, and to create structures, within the EU or in paral-
lel, which would be intergovernmental in nature and limited to
like-minded States. This is why Mr. Giscard d'Estaing and Presi-
dent Chirac provoked a conflict between the large Member
States and the small ones, which had not arisen before, and
which has not been resolved by the Convention. In effect, the
French have tried to say to the new Member States "come into
the European Union on French terms. Do not agree with the
United States too strongly if France disagrees with it. If you do
not want to enter on those terms, do not enter."
XIII. REFERENDA
Referenda to approve the new Constitutional Treaty are de-
sirable in as many Member States as possible for several reasons:
- It will be important to establish that the final version of the
new Treaty was accepted by the peoples of the EU, and not
merely by their governments and parliaments.
- Knowing that the final version of the Treaty must be put to
referenda will lead all the politicians discussing it to make it
as clear, intelligible, and as acceptable everywhere as possi-
ble, and to make sure that it is explained and understood.
- Referenda will create a feeling of European solidarity which
no other procedure could create.
- Referenda should put an end to campaigns to take certain
States out of the EU, if those States held referenda.
It may be that France, which has never been enthusiastic
about enlargement, would not regret it if some small States re-
fused to accept the new Constitutional Treaty, for whatever rea-
son.
XIV. WHAT SHOULD BE THE POLICY OF A SMALL STATE?
A small State's policy objectives should be:
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- To protect the rights and powers of the small Member
States, and to minimise intergovernmentalism in any form.
- To minimize or cure the present divisions on foreign policy
attitudes and defence structures in Europe.
- To try to ensure, even if the Constitutional Treaty that
emerges from the Convention and the IGC is imperfect,
temporary or in need of further change, that it represents a
satisfactory foundation for the future, and not one that will
lead to a less satisfactory structure.
- Ireland should have an additional objective: to minimize
any divergence of policies between the UK and the other
Member States. The outburst of biased and ill-informed
criticism of the Convention in the British media in May-
June 2003 shows how opposed the English media are to any
improvement or consolidation of the EU, and Ireland
needs close cooperation from the UK to deal with the Irish
Republican Army and the conflict in Northern Ireland.
In fact, the policy of all small States ought to be to reverse
the mistake made in the Nice Treaty and the Convention and to
insist that the Commission always include one voting nominee of
each Member State. The Nice Treaty is just as open to reconsid-
eration and renegotiation as all the other Treaties.
Small States' policy should be to strengthen the Commis-
sion. All small States need the Commission. A prejudice against
the Commission, however, has developed in Ireland and else-
where in recent years. This seems to be because the Commission
has insisted on States carrying out their obligations under EU
law. This prejudice is irrational and self-destructive. For small
States, the Commission's law-enforcement role is at least as im-
portant as, if not more important than, its policy-proposing role
under the Community method. It ought to be clear that the
Commission must enforce the law equally against all Member
States. It also ought to be clear - but apparently it is not - that
smaller States have much more to gain than to lose from the
Commission enforcing, for example, EU rules on State aid. If
Member States indulge in unrestrained competition to subsidize
their domestic industries, France and Germany can afford to pay
larger subsidies for longer than small States. It is therefore
clearly in small States' interests to strengthen the Commission,
and not to allow pique or irritation to weaken policy in this re-
spect. Small States would not be better off, in a Union of twenty-
five or thirty States, with a weak Commission. Small States also
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need the Commission to apply the rules on State aid strictly in
the ten new Member States. Small States cannot have a Commis-
sion that is firm with all the other Member States and lax when
dealing with them. The interests of small States call for a Com-
mission that is respected by other Member States, and whose pol-
icy proposals will be taken seriously and whose decisions will be
respected and carried out.
This calls for a clear-sighted recognition that the small
States made a mistake in Nice when they allowed themselves to
be pressured into agreeing to reduce the size of the Commis-
sion. Nominal equality, such as in rotating Commissioners is
dangerously self-deceptive: a small State without a voting Com-
missioner is never in the same position as a large State without a
voting Commissioner.
In an enlarged Union of twenty-five or more States, a small
State will have less influence, be less able to obtain special treat-
ment, and agreements will be harder to reach, even by qualified
majority. Therefore, sound and well-balanced Commission pro-
posals, designed to be as generally acceptable as possible, are
essential. This necessitates a Commission composed of one
nominee from each State.
There is another reason why prejudice against the Commis-
sion has arisen: many people in Ireland read English newspa-
pers, and most English newspapers are opposed, strongly or
moderately, to the EU in general and the Commission in partic-
ular. Swedish prejudices against the EU are similarly accentu-
ated by reading Danish newspapers. Irish interests in Europe
are very different from those of the United Kingdom, and Ire-
land and Sweden should formulate their own policies without
being influenced by English or Danish prejudices. 9
Prejudices are dangerous as is the fear of thinking clearly
and frankly about unexamined and outdated assumptions. Neu-
trality, in Sweden and Ireland, is one such assumption. What
contemporary reasons are there for it? What sacrifices should be
made for it? Moreover, to what degree does it give a right to
have other countries defend our interests without any contribu-
tion? These questions need to be analyzed honestly and frankly.
Clear thinking is particularly necessary because the reasons
why the existing EU institutions were designed are not well-
39. Scots, by comparison, are much less anti-European.
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known or understood. The discussions in the Convention have
been seriously handicapped by the lack of any European
equivalent of the "Federalist Papers" in which Madison, Hamil-
ton, and Jay explained the U.S. Constitution to the inhabitants
of New York and to the American people.
In the IGC, there will be important negotiations on institu-
tional questions. The result is likely to be a compromise. In
such negotiations, each State must have priorities and a negotia-
tion strategy. There are several basic principles:
- Never give away a lasting across-the-board concession (e.g.,
agreeing to reduce the size of the Commission) to obtain a
narrow concession that is likely to be temporary.
- Never give away a concession of undoubted value (e.g., the
size of the Commission) in exchange for a concession that
may prove to be of little value, or even damaging.
- Never make a concession that affects the interests of the
State as a whole, merely to satisfy the views or interests of
one particular lobby. Sacrificing the right to nominate a
voting Commissioner, in order to keep a veto on other EU
measures, was contrary to these three principles.
- Always look into the future as far as possible, and seek the
concessions with the greatest lasting value. This is being
done by at least two large States.
- Never be unnecessarily obstructive. Supposedly neutral
countries cannot both refuse to take part in foreign policy
measures and prevent other Member States from adopting
them. A State should not object to effective common mea-
sures to combat terrorism or organised crime merely be-
cause they would involve changes in criminal law.
- Know your priorities. Ministers went to Nice saying they
were determined to keep the right to nominate a Commis-
sioner; they came back having given it away.
- Try to ensure that all Member States obtain a new Constitu-
tional Treaty which will be approved in referenda and
which all States can and will ratify. A State which does not
ratify the new Treaty will find it extremely hard to influence
the development of the EU, even if it ratifies later.
It may be argued that small States should not try to get back
the right to nominate a voting Commissioner at all times, be-
cause that would lead the large States to reopen the voting rights
agreed on in Nice. But the large States are already trying in vari-
ous ways to get more power in the Council and the Parliament
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than was agreed on in Nice. The importance of the Commission
for small States is crucial and too important to be left to purely
tactical considerations. Only the Community method can pre-
vent the hegemony of the large States.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that after the next IGC, the EU will deal with eco-
nomic and social matters by the Community method and with
foreign policy by an intergovernmental method. The overriding
aim of all the small countries should be to ensure that the Com-
munity method is not devalued by the reduction in the number
of voting members of the Commission. It is more important to
maintain the size of the Commission than to have Parliament
elect the President of the Commission. For the small Member
States in particular, maintaining the size of the Commission,
with one voting nominee from each State, is even more impor-
tant than the question of the Foreign Minister (and even to a
Council President with limited functions), because foreign pol-
icy will, in any case, be intergovernmental. Small countries must
look ahead to the time when the EU will decide to have one
method for both economic and foreign policy, because then it
will be crucial for small States that the method chosen be the
Community method.
At this stage, it is impossible to reach a final evaluation of
the work of the Convention. Whether it will ultimately be
judged a success will depend on the next IGC rather than on the
Convention itself. Nevertheless, several comments can be made.
First, the concept of a Convention to discuss and draft what
rapidly came to be seen as a whole new constitution was un-
doubtedly a success. The atmosphere and attitudes within the
Convention came to be very different from the petty diplomatic
bargaining of previous IGCs, and from the deplorable confusion
and profoundly unsatisfactory result of Nice. For the first time
since 1956, and for the first time explicitly, Europeans set out to
draft a constitution for Europe. This success is shown by the rel-
ative ease with which agreement was reached on the series of
apparently technical provisions about constitutional issues that
were summarized in this Article. But it was more fundamental
than that: the participants in the Convention knew that they
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were designing and writing a wholly new kind of constitution,
not merely revising a group of existing Treaties.
Second, whether the new Constitution becomes a lasting
success or another less than satisfactory stage in the develop-
ment of the EU depends crucially on how the major issues, left
unresolved by the Convention, are ultimately dealt with by fu-
ture IGCs. This, in turn, will depend on whether the small Mem-
ber States understand clearly what is at stake and are determined
to insist on a sound result. This remains to be seen: the small
States gave in weakly in Nice, and they may do so again. So far,
the result of the Convention is, in crucial respects, a political and
intellectual muddle.
The major issues explained in this Article all concern the
choice between the Community method and the intergovern-
mental approach. The result of the next IGC will not be the
clear-cut adoption of either, but a mixture of the two. One solu-
tion would be for a vote in the Council to require a majority of
States and of the population, and in return for every State to
have a right to nominate a voting Commissioner at all times.
The President of the Commission will presumably be elected or
approved by the European Parliament (a Community method
result), but with a Council President chosen intergovernmentally
by Heads of State. How such a mixture would work cannot be
foretold at this stage: much would depend on the practice con-
cerning the Council President, since the rules are not clear.
A third, and more important, long-term conclusion can al-
ready be suggested. It has been taken for granted in the Con-
vention that the Community method, in the only meaningful
sense of the Commission's exclusive right to propose new poli-
cies and measures, was not going to be applied to common for-
eign and security policy. This means that the EU will continue
to have two entirely different sets of procedures for foreign and
security policy and for economic matters, the first essentially in-
tergovernmental, the second based on the Community method.
The EU would be "multipolar" both in the sense of having two
methods of taking decisions and also in the sense of having two
Presidents of two distinct EU institutions, plus a Foreign Minis-
ter. This multiplication is irrational and unfortunate because it
has not been clearly understood and stated that the Community
method and the Commission's exclusive right to propose EU
measures are essential to majority voting.
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Until the Community method is applied to common foreign
and security policy, the EU, unlike any other organization, will
have two distinct sets of institutions and procedures, one for for-
eign policy, the other for economic and social policy. That is
not a rational structure, and one hopes that it will be a tempo-
rary one.
Fourth, the Convention proposals present a fundamental
defect: two new offices are proposed and a strengthened foreign
policy envisaged, yet nothing is done to ensure democratic or
judicial control over any of them. The basic conception is still
intergovernmental4 ° and is neither democratic nor compatible
with the Community method. One of the difficulties is that
some governments which might be expected to be in favor of
democratic control do not want to have it provided by the Euro-
pean Parliament.
For the reasons given above, the intergovernmental method
is self-defeating, and will create solutions which will be neither
satisfactory nor permanent. Europe will still be a work in pro-
gress after the next IGC. The Philadelphia Convention in 1786
had a much easier job and was more successful. But the achieve-
ment of peace in Europe is a greater achievement than ob-
taining victory in North America.
One of the reasons why the Philadelphia Convention was
more successful was that all of the delegates agreed that they
were trying to devise the best constitution for the then thirteen
United States. They had no conflicting loyalties, although they
disagreed about how much power should be centralized. By
contrast, the difficulties which have arisen in Europe have
largely been due to the fact that the French and British govern-
ments have been trying to obtain the solutions which would max-
imize their influence. Only when the most influential politicians
in Europe put European interests first, as they did when the
Community was set up, will truly satisfactory long-term solutions
be reached.
The long-term implications of the Convention's results also
are unsatisfactory. This Article has explained why a Commission
which is reduced in size would be regarded as unsatisfactory.
40. See DEHOUSSE, supra note 27, at 28 (quoting Jacques Delors as stating "[t]he
intergovernmental scenario is prevalent in the Franco-German paper and the federal
scenario is not").
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The distinction between economic and social affairs, subject to
the Community method, and foreign and security affairs, subject
to the intergovernmental method without effective democratic
control, will increasingly be regarded as unsatisfactory, as indeed
it is. Eventually, the conclusion will be reached that both eco-
nomic and foreign policy should be dealt with under one
method, and that a choice must be made. Because a Commis-
sion reduced in size would be regarded as unsatisfactory, the
conclusion might be reached at that time that the Community
method should be abandoned. When that time comes, it is ex-
tremely important that the Community method should be ready
for use in foreign and security policy, and should not have been
devalued. That is the real long-term danger of the reduction in
the size of the Commission which was agreed on in Nice. The
Convention has done nothing to reduce that danger, and has in
fact increased it.
"There are many things in the Commonwealth ... which I rather
wish than hope to see adopted in our own."41
41. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (1516).
